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I.  INTRODUCTION 
This is an exciting book.1  Not only is it a tour de force of all the 
important moral issues relating to genetics, but it is written by what can 
only be called a dream team of bioethicists.2  For the past quarter 
century, these four individuals have exerted a profound influence on the 
creation and direction of the field of bioethics, and now this book will 
surely be the starting point for ethical work on genetics into much of the 
new century. 
 
 *  Professor of Law and Public Health, Wake Forest University. 
 1. ALLEN BUCHANAN ET AL., FROM CHANCE TO CHOICE: GENETICS AND JUSTICE 
(2000). 
 2. This team is composed of the following members: Allen Buchanan, Dan W. 
Brock, Norman Daniels, and Daniel Wikler. 
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In this brief Essay, I focus on chapter 4 of the book’s discussion of the 
distinction between treatment and enhancement.3  This distinction is at 
the core of many of the most challenging problems of ethics and public 
policy raised by genetics.  This is also the place where there appears to 
be disagreement or ambivalence among these authors4 and where fault 
lines appear in their otherwise remarkably united front. 
II.  THE AUTHORS’ ARGUMENT 
Because the analysis in chapter 4 is complex and subtle, I will begin 
with a summary outline of it so that I can more precisely identify the 
location and importance of the points I want to address within the 
chapter’s overall structure.  Chapter 3 lays the groundwork with the 
important insight that genetics radically alters the conventional domain 
of distributive justice.5  No longer can we assume that the distribution of 
personal traits and characteristics is beyond the reach of distributive justice, 
subject only to luck or natural forces.  Instead, we must contemplate the 
serious possibility that many of our constitutive characteristics can be 
chosen and engineered.  This awesome ability will depend on access to 
genetic technologies, which has profound implications for how to think 
about resource allocation and redistribution and about social entitlements 
and duties.  I largely agree with how these issues are presented and analyzed 
at a general, conceptual level in chapter 3.6 
Chapter 4 then takes the analysis to a somewhat more concrete level.  
It asks whether, in the imagined world of vastly expanded technological 
control over genetics, we should think differently about fixing genetic 
diseases than we do about enhancing genetic traits.7 
First, the authors argued, and I agree, that enhancement versus 
treatment is a meaningful distinction;8 one with considerable ambiguity 
in close cases but one that has and will retain practical significance, 
even if the line shifts or cannot be precisely drawn.  In my view, the 
distinction is based on concepts of normality that are a fundamental 
aspect of human psychology, deeply and biologically imbedded in how 
 
 3. See BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 104–55. 
 4. See id. at 149. 
 5. Id. at 63. 
 6. See id. at 61–103.  One point of disagreement is that, in stressing a 
requirement of genetic intervention to correct natural or social inequalities, the authors 
appear to go much further than necessary toward raising troubling issues of personal 
autonomy.  See id. at 77–79.  There is no reason to even suggest or suppose that 
distributive justice might require forcing corrective measures on competent adults who 
do not want them for themselves or for their children.  The requirement at issue is one 
imposed on society to provide access or funding. 
 7. See id. at 104–55. 
 8. See id. at 109–10. 
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we perceive and conceptualize patterns of variation in any realm of 
experience.  Even if the particulars change in what we view as being 
normal, the underlying concept of normality and therefore of corrections 
versus enhancements will remain. 
Second, the authors considered various objections to giving this 
distinction moral weight.  They considered the apparent arbitrariness of 
drawing such a line,9 illustrated with examples from current practices by 
health insurers in deciding what to cover under the concept of “medical 
necessity.”10  The authors provided a nuanced and insightful analysis of 
some of the practicalities in designing and interpreting a set of health 
insurance benefits.11 
Following this, the authors addressed arguments that, even if the 
distinction between treatment and enhancement is sensible and practical, 
this distinction does not define what is ethically permissible or 
obligatory.12  In other words, it is not a faithful proxy for underlying, 
fundamental, moral constructs.  Giving special moral status to treatment 
and viewing enhancement as problematic may be either underinclusive 
or overinclusive of how we would resolve particular moral questions 
from a more fundamental vantage point. 
Fourth, the authors’ primary response to these imagined attacks was to 
invoke Norman Daniels’s well-known position that distributive justice 
requires society to do what is feasible to maintain the normal species 
functioning that is necessary for each person to have a fair range of 
opportunities.13  The distinction between treatment and enhancement 
does not perfectly match the normal functioning concept, but it is close 
enough to serve as a practical proxy or surrogate for the more 
fundamental principle. 
Fifth, the authors considered why distributive justice does not require 
that genetic enhancements be used or restricted to produce a more 
perfectly level version of equality.14  They observed that seeking perfect 
equality of opportunity is unrealistic because of practical limitations and 
competing values.15  Liberty concerns keep us from restricting others’ 
abilities, opportunities, or accomplishments simply in order to achieve 
 
 9. See id. at 110–18. 
 10. Id. at 110–12. 
 11. See id. at 112–13. 
 12. See id. at 118–21. 
 13. See id. at 121–23, 126–30. 
 14. See id. at 129–30. 
 15. See id. at 127–28. 
FINALHALL.DOC 2/11/2020  11:45 AM 
 
672 
perfect equality with those least advantaged—“leveling down.”16  In the 
past, biological and resource limitations greatly restricted what could be 
done to improve the physical and mental functioning of the 
disadvantaged—“leveling up.”  Therefore, so far we have been forced to 
tolerate sizeable inequalities. 
Genetics, however, creates the potential to greatly reduce the 
opportunity gap with powerful and inexpensive tools for altering 
fundamental human abilities.  Therefore, the authors acknowledged that 
the argument for expanding health care entitlements beyond treatment of 
disease becomes much stronger.17  However, they maintained that these 
possible uses of genetic enhancement should be considered exceptional, 
case-by-case departures from the disease model and not part of the basic 
conceptual framework for health care entitlements.18 
III.  MY CRITIQUE 
My critique of this argument focuses on the fourth, fifth, and last 
points above.  These points are the most critical and the ones where my 
disagreement is most pronounced.  My approach to these issues will not 
have nearly the same philosophical sophistication as these authors 
brought to bear.  Instead, I will use a more intuitive analysis, informed 
by my understanding of the issues in the second point, namely, how 
health insurance works and why it is structured the way it is. 
A.  Versions of Equality 
The authors started their analysis with Norman Daniels’s normal 
species functioning position19 and then asked whether any significant 
deviation or alteration is justified by genetics.20  For a project this 
ambitious, one that considers issues at such a fundamental level and 
reflects on the potentially radical significance of futuristic genetic 
technologies, I think it is incumbent to go further back in the chain of 
reasoning that produced the normal functioning position.  That requires 
us to consider the fundamental aims of distributive justice. 
As a starting point for thinking about equality, I believe that most 
people hold the untutored instinctive view that the authors label the 
“brute luck” version of equality.21  However, this is only the starting 
 
 16. See id. at 128. 
 17. See id. at 129. 
 18. See id. at 17, 129. 
 19. See id. at 121–23, 126–30. 
 20. See id. at 129. 
 21. See id. at 67, 109. 
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point, not the ending position, for ethical analysis.  People by and large 
believe that it is unfair to limit opportunities based on factors not within 
their control.  Therefore, it is the general aim of distributive justice to 
correct for misfortunes produced by the natural lottery.  However, after a 
moment’s reflection, we realize this cannot be fully accomplished 
because of competing practical and value based reasons, as noted above.  
Concerns about individual liberty prevent us from denying opportunities 
and accomplishments to the more fortunate simply to close the gap.  Our 
technical and economic abilities to assist the less fortunate are inherently 
limited.  Therefore, society adopts compromise versions of equality that 
seem, in the circumstances, to best accommodate these competing pulls. 
How these competing forces are best resolved will differ across time 
and among social spheres.22  Sometimes we may settle on correcting 
only abnormal deficits, but other times we seek to improve normal 
abilities; or we may sometimes strive for a decent minimum standard, 
while in other arenas we attempt to achieve a fairly level form of 
equality.  These versions are not determined once and for all by 
fundamental moral principles; they are worked out at a more pragmatic 
level where the solutions are subject to fairly radical revision as 
circumstances change. 
Consider, for instance, education.  We are born with a wide range of 
abilities and opportunities to learn and think.  Society seeks to equalize 
these mental attributes through a highly egalitarian system of publicly 
funded schools that, ideally, seeks to achieve more than a decent 
minimum.  However, achieving perfect equality and correcting abnormal 
deficits are not the primary goals.  Traditionally, public education has 
sought to enhance mental skills starting from a normal range of abilities.  
It encourages the best and brightest to achieve the most, and, until recent 
decades, it did not do much to address the needs of the mentally 
handicapped.  The last point has changed markedly, however, due to 
increased resources and technical abilities.  We now know much more 
about educational techniques for learning disabilities and mental 
handicaps, and society is able to devote more resources to this purpose 
than before. 
The version of equality that exists now for health care is 
fundamentally different.  In this sphere, the principal focus is on disease, 
 
 22. See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND 
EQUALITY 3–6, 10 (1983). 
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and most resources go to those with the greatest needs.  However, the 
goal is not to provide equal amounts of the best possible health care to 
everyone.  Instead, we accept wide disparities in access as long as a 
decent minimum level of care is available through hospital emergency 
rooms and government sponsored clinics.  These compromises are 
driven not only by resource limitations but also by the practical realities 
of health care.  It is possible with food, housing, education, and other 
similar necessities of life to distribute the basic social minimum in more 
or less equal increments through vouchers or by providing the service 
directly.  The extraordinarily diverse nature of medical needs, however, 
means they cannot be met through any notion of equal or similar 
increments of service.  Therefore, the only way to meet our humanitarian 
commitment to a decent level of health care is to provide guaranteed 
access to a comprehensive range of services, which we do through social 
insurance programs—Medicare and Medicaid.  Because health related 
benefits are potentially limitless, however, insurance would not be 
affordable without constraints on what and how much is covered.23  This 
is the principal role of the medical necessity criterion, which is 
interpreted in a way that emphasizes the treatment of disease. 
These features of health insurance are subject to change, however, as 
technical abilities, available resources, and structural aspects of medicine 
change.  If these attributes change radically, so too may our concept of 
health care equality.  The authors entertained these possibilities,24 but 
dismissed or minimized them too readily.  To demonstrate that health 
care equality is not inherently limited to disease, I consider further the 
status of enhancements in current medical and insurance practices and 
whether this secondary status is inevitable. 
B.  Treatment of Disease Versus Enhancement of Health 
For centuries, disease has been the defining concept of the sphere 
of medicine.  Disease determines the goals, attitudes, techniques, and 
justification for what medicine is and does.  However, this is not an 
absolute or unalterable condition, and it may be undergoing radical 
revision.  Over the second half of the twentieth century, health, rather 
than disease, has emerged as a competing concept of equal importance 
that points in a somewhat different direction.  Maintaining and 
improving health encompasses disease but is not limited to disease.  
Health promotion emphasizes disease prevention as well as correction.  
 
 23. MARK A. HALL, MAKING MEDICAL SPENDING DECISIONS: THE LAW, ETHICS, 
AND ECONOMICS OF RATIONING MECHANISMS 5–6 (1997). 
 24. See BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 123. 
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Alternative, more holistic, views of health underscore the possibility of 
achieving a sense of health even in the presence of unconquerable 
disease.  Health also introduces a more generalized notion of well-being 
that allows medicine to enter other arenas of life, such as diet, exercise, 
and various sources of stress.25 
These changes have been operative not only in notions of what doctors 
may permissibly do but also in respect to what insurance is obligated to 
cover under the concept of medical necessity.  My own recent physical 
exam is a case in point.  I had not had a physical in ten years, and, 
entering my mid forties, I wanted a thorough going over.  First, it is 
notable that I had nothing wrong, yet my insurance covered the full cost.  
Based on prior experience, I expected a battery of tests, probes, and the 
like, which I received; but I was surprised to learn that this was 
incidental to what my visit was mainly about.  The visit began with a 
long questionnaire about my general happiness; my job; my marriage; 
what I eat, drink, and smoke; how well I am sleeping; and how much I 
exercise.  Anything I marked that was potentially troubling, my doctor 
raised in our lengthy conversation, which occupied about two-thirds of 
the checkup.  This conversation convinced me to join a health club and 
to begin exercising regularly for the first time in my life.  I now have 
more energy, I sleep better, and I do not use alcohol as much as I once 
did for stress reduction. 
I think we would all agree that this is a model of good doctoring and 
that this type of service should be included in a mandatory package of 
health care benefits.26  Observe, however, that this service is only 
tangentially addressed to disease; more immediately it is directed in 
large part to health benefits achieved through enhancement.  The physician 
increased my awareness of these issues, and my exercise is enhancing 
my previously good health as well as forestalling future illness. 
However, if health insurance and medical practice encompass health 
 
 25. See generally ROBERT A. ARONOWITZ, MAKING SENSE OF ILLNESS: SCIENCE, 
SOCIETY, AND DISEASE (1998); CONCEPTS OF HEALTH AND DISEASE (Arthur L. Caplan et 
al., eds., 1981). 
 26. Norman Daniels objects that I fail to recognize that his normal functioning 
concept is broader than the traditional disease focus of medicine because his formulation 
also encompasses prevention and public health measures that modify social determinants 
of health.  Letter from Norman Daniels, to the Participants of the University of San 
Diego School of Law Symposium, Genes and the Just Society (Feb. 2002) (on file with 
author).  However, this very progression in the scope of what medicine undertakes 
makes my point that the proper domain of medicine has evolved, and likely will continue 
to evolve, as information and technologies develop. 
FINALHALL.DOC 2/11/2020  11:45 AM 
 
676 
enhancement, why does my health plan not pay for my health club 
membership?  Does this not indicate that the disease model still 
prevails?  Several responses come quickly to mind.  First, the evolution 
is only partial and incomplete.  Second, some health plans do cover 
health club membership or membership is sometimes paid for or 
subsidized by employers.  Third, to the extent insurers continue to resist 
paying for exercise, this is likely for pragmatic reasons not for reasons of 
principle.  Countless aspects of life influence health, and so it is not 
feasible for insurance to pay for all, or even most, beneficial 
interventions that promote health.  If health club membership were 
allowed, what about mountain biking or downhill skiing?  The 
slipperiness of these slopes (pun intended) is the main reason for 
limiting insurance coverage. The fact that these limits are articulated in 
terms of medical necessity or connection to disease is due more to the 
malleability of these concepts and their historical role in this realm than 
to fundamental principle. 
This loose understanding of insurance helps to place in proper context the 
examples used by the authors to defend their position.  They contrasted the 
following: (i) two equally short boys, one with growth hormone deficiency 
and the other without,27 and (ii) two equally shy adults, one with and one 
without a diagnosable psychiatric condition.28  They correctly observed 
that under current insurance practices, only the people whose condition 
is caused by disease or injury will be covered.29  Nevertheless, the 
authors read more significance into these somewhat selective examples 
than is warranted. 
Whether these examples are prototypical or exceptional depends on 
how one frames the issue and from what point of view.  There is no doubt 
that the disease concept strongly influences insurance coverage and 
medical practice.  The issue is whether this is subject to evolutionary 
change or substantial supplementation.  Viewed over time, the very fact 
that insurance covers any psychological counseling or any use of the 
human growth hormone shows some evolution in our insurance based 
concept of medical necessity.  Whether this evolution finds its equilibrium 
at this particular compromise or whether coverage expands or contracts 
is determined by the practicalities of these particular conditions and so is 
likely to follow different routes for each example.  At present, coverage 
of mental therapy appears to be splitting into two paths divided between 
organic versus behavioral causes and treatments.  The bioengineered 
human growth hormone is extremely expensive and in somewhat short 
 
 27. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 115–18. 
 28. Id. at 115–16; see also id. at 111. 
 29. See id. at 110–11. 
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supply; its proper use is still controversial and the long term effects 
uncertain; and parents can assert very strong demands.  Therefore, 
physicians have, in a somewhat paternalistic manner, adopted very strict 
and objective criteria for when it is even permissible to use the hormone, 
and insurers have, for the most part, simply followed this medical 
practice.  If costs decrease or controversy over proper use abates, these 
restrictions will probably loosen. 
Even currently, the disease concept does not exert nearly the same 
influence in other areas of medicine and insurance.  I can easily have my 
doctor prescribe sleeping pills, covered by insurance, merely based on 
symptoms of insomnia, without regard to the underlying cause or any 
diagnosable disease.  Many other medical conditions are treated based 
purely or primarily on symptoms rather than etiology.  Common examples 
include obesity, elevated cholesterol, and high blood pressure.  In the 
purely psychological realm, although it is controversial to prescribe 
Prozac™ for general mood improvement, this increasingly is being done 
and paid for by insurance, as it was for Valium®, using malleable mental 
diagnoses that are clearly unrelated to any specific psychological etiology.  
Some insurance covers, and some does not, in vitro fertilization for 
infertile couples, but the disagreement is fundamentally not about whether 
infertility is abnormal or whether it results from some other disease 
condition.  Instead, coverage variations result from concerns over the cost 
of the procedure and whether the concentrated high demand for this 
coverage undermines the ability to pool and spread these costs—what 
economists refer to as “adverse selection.”  Similar points apply to 
contraception and Viagra®.30  Arguments for and against covering these 
services may be framed in terms of disease, abnormality, and the like, for 
those remain the operative concepts; but the pattern of results reached 
does not consistently match any principled understanding of these 
concepts.  Rather, this pattern is driven by other, more pragmatic 
considerations rooted in the institutional structure and economics of 
insurance. 
In sum, health insurance covers what doctors do, up to a limit; and 
doctors do what is technically feasible and professionally acceptable in 
order to promote health and well-being.  Disease has been the dominant 
conceptual guide to insurance because, in earlier decades, medical 
 
 30. See, e.g., Alison Keith, The Economics of Viagra, HEALTH AFF., Mar./Apr. 
2000, at 147, 155. 
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practice followed the disease model.  But as medical practice and concepts 
have evolved, so has insurance, subject to practical limitations of 
maintaining affordable insurance.  Disease based concepts of insurance 
coverage contain inherent limitations that help confine insurance to more 
easily defined and administered boundaries.  Health and wellness do not 
and so result in a jagged boundary, defined inconsistently from one case to 
the next.  This is nicely illustrated by the following satirical explanation 
of why happiness (not its opposite) might easily be considered a 
psychiatric disorder: “[H]appiness meets all reasonable criteria for a 
psychiatric disorder.  It is statistically abnormal [and] consists of a 
discrete cluster of symptoms . . . .”31 
[H]appiness is usually characterized by a positive mood, sometimes described 
as “elation” or “joy,” although this may be relatively absent in the milder happy 
states, sometimes termed “contentment.” . . .  The behavioral components of 
happiness . . . suggest that happy people are often carefree, impulsive, and 
unpredictable in their actions . . . including a high frequency of recreational 
interpersonal contacts and prosocial actions towards others identified as less 
happy . . . . 
 . . . There is excellent experimental evidence that happy people are 
irrational . . . .  Happy people have been shown to exhibit various biases of 
judgment that prevent them from acquiring a realistic understanding of their 
physical and social environment. . . . 
 . . . Acceptance of these arguments leads to the obvious conclusion that 
happiness should be included in future taxonomies of mental illness . . . .  I 
humbly suggest that the term ‘happiness’ be replaced by the more formal 
description major affective disorder, pleasant type, in the interests of scientific 
precision and in the hope of reducing any possible diagnostic ambiguities.32 
C.  Normal Species Functioning 
Against this backdrop, how should we view the vast potential for 
genetic enhancement?  I am not convinced that the primary guide should 
be whether a particular genetic technology responds to what we now 
conceive of as a disease or abnormality.  It is too easy to think of 
compelling, contrary examples.  Suppose, for instance, that genes could be 
altered to allow people to feel fully rested and refreshed with only half as 
much sleep, thereby extending effective waking time by four hours a day.  
The need for sleep is a natural biological limitation, so a disease model 
would not include this enhancement, yet the enhancement would have vast 
potential for increasing abilities, opportunities, and life experiences.  
These authors presumably would consider this as a possible exceptional 
case that justifies departure from their disease based equality framework.  
 
 31. Richard P. Bentall, Words: A Proposal to Classify Happiness as a Psychiatric 
Disorder, 18 J. MED. ETHICS 94, 97 (1992). 
 32. Id. at 96–97. 
FINALHALL.DOC 2/11/2020  11:45 AM 
[VOL. 39:  669, 2002]  Genetic Enhancement 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 679 
But whether it should be an exception or part of the rule turns simply on 
how many such cases one can expect, and the authors invited us to think 
imaginatively.  Even viewed as exceptional, resolving this and countless 
other possibilities requires an appeal to principles and concepts more 
fundamental than normal species functioning, which indicates that this 
concept no longer will be a reliable guide. 
There are a series of additional reasons I am not convinced that it will 
make sense to adhere to the normal species functioning guide in an era 
of vastly expanded genetic enhancement.  Space does not permit full 
development, but I will briefly outline them.  First, even if the disease 
model remains dominant, the vast expansion of genetic technologies is 
almost certain to alter society’s sense of what is normal, and therefore 
what is a disease.  Over the course of the twentieth century, the range of 
normalcy for many medical measures and conditions has shifted in sync 
with external—nonmedical—social developments, including height, 
weight, and the length of life.  Thus, what is now considered clinically 
significant obesity or a shortened life span is considerably different than 
a century ago.33  Medicine is, thankfully, not wedded to an unalterable 
concept of its proper domain. 
The aspect of Daniels’s prescription that is in conflict with this view is 
his stress on species normality.34  Were we to think simply in terms of 
normal functioning, then the shift in biological and social norms would 
encompass technologies that now are thought of as enhancements but in 
the future may well be viewed as directed toward biological 
abnormalities.35  This is especially likely after several generations of 
germ line enhancements.  I do not see in principles of distributive justice 
the limitation that we consider only characteristics of the species in its 
natural state.  Normalcy may be the proper guide but normalcy is distinct 
 
 33. See generally James O. Hill & John C. Peters, Environmental Contributions to 
the Obesity Epidemic, 280 SCIENCE 1371 (1998); Gary Taubes, As Obesity Rates Rise, 
Experts Struggle to Explain Why, 280 SCIENCE 1367 (1998).  These types of objective 
measures are also culturally contingent even within a given time frame.  For instance, the 
body temperature considered normal varies by as much as a degree or two among 
Western industrialized countries.  See George J. Annas and Frances H. Miller, The 
Empire of Death: How Culture and Economics Affect Informed Consent in the U.S., the 
U.K., and Japan, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 357, 360 (1994).  Similarly, I suspect, but I do not 
really know for sure, that the level of cholesterol considered clinically troubling likely 
varies from one medical system to another. 
 34. See BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 73–75, 121. 
 35. See generally Peter H. Huang, Herd Behavior in Designer Genes, 34 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 639 (1999). 
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from naturalness, as the authors noted in chapter 3 of the book.36  This 
point is also consistent with their concern that genetic enhancement may 
aggravate disability discrimination.37 
Finally, even if genetic enhancements were excluded from the domain 
of distributive justice that applies to the sphere of medicine, we must 
also consider how we would regard enhancements under other spheres 
or, indeed, if genetics would become a new sphere of its own.  Without 
the current technologies of modern society, we would have no concept 
of entitlement to transportation, and entitlement to welfare assistance 
would make no sense without a monetary system.  Genetics can be 
expected to have an equally transformative impact on society.  
Therefore, we must consider whether, apart from medicine or any 
existing sphere, there will arise a sense of entitlement to genetic 
services.  If so, surely genetic enhancements will be included in the mix 
because disease is a limitation imposed only in the sphere of medicine.  
Even if this new sphere does not arise, genetic enhancements, such as 
some of those the authors posit,38 might fall within the sphere of 
education.  Observe how, over the space of only a decade, we have come 
to the view that using computers in the primary grades is essential to 
providing an adequate range of future opportunities. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
I am fully convinced by the authors’ explanation that there is a deeply 
pragmatic dimension to moral intuitions.39  We naturally intuit only the 
range of options that are feasible and for which we have experience.  In 
the past, large scale improvement of baseline human traits was not 
possible and still may never be feasible or become commonplace.  
However, if this does come about, then surely our existing intuitions will 
shift concerning the moral significance of the boundary between 
treatment and enhancement.  This does not mean that our intuitions are 
fickle or are a poor guide.  Instead, this forces us to think about the 
deeper moral principles that underlie these intuitions.  Doing so leads me 
to conclude that the goal of distributive justice should be to achieve as 
much equality of opportunity as is technically feasible without 
compromising other important social and ethical demands. 
For now, and within medicine, normal species functioning serves as a 
reasonably reliable proxy for operationalizing this version of medical 
equality.  But when we begin to open our minds to the full potential of 
 
 36. See BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 74. 
 37. See id. at 107. 
 38. See id. at 152–53. 
 39. See id. at 123. 
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genetics, it is easy to conceive of a time when this will no longer be the 
case.  These authors did a very good job helping us think about what 
these conditions may look like.  My only criticism is that they struggle 
too hard to hold onto an older notion of the goals of medicine and so are 
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